When a major power decides to test the limits of the international order, othe… · @WizarGod · TwKit

@WizarGod

When a major power decides to test the limits of the international order, other countries’ responses—whether they push back or accept a “limited exception”—will be remembered by those who come later. That is precisely where the danger lies! Russia’s actions in Crimea in 2014 and eastern Ukraine in 2022 directly challenged one of the most fundamental principles of the postwar international order: a country must not unilaterally change another country’s borders through the use of force. If such behavior is ultimately tolerated and frozen into a fait accompli without imposing a sufficiently high cost, it sends a signal to every potential territorial aggressor: as long as you are powerful enough, sufficiently bold, and capable of withstanding short-term sanctions and international condemnation, the strategy of “seize the territory first and negotiate later” may prove viable in the long run. Once this precedent is accepted, the consequences will extend far beyond Ukraine and Europe. European Security: NATO’s eastern flank will remain under sustained pressure, while countries such as the Baltic states and Poland will become increasingly concerned about who might be targeted next. America’s Global Interests: The international order that the United States has helped uphold rests on the principle that borders cannot be arbitrarily changed through the use of force. If this principle is violated in Europe without an effective response, the credibility of that principle—and of the U.S.-led international order—could also be weakened in other regions, including the Indo-Pacific and the Middle East. The Risk of Imitation: This could create a dangerous precedent that other countries might follow. Nations with territorial claims or historical disputes may reassess the costs and benefits of using force to change the status quo. Taiwan inevitably comes to mind in this context. Beijing has consistently regarded Taiwan as a core interest and repeatedly stated that it does not rule out the use of force. If Russia’s actions in Ukraine are perceived as having produced an acceptable outcome, some analysts worry that this could reduce Beijing’s concerns about using force to change the status quo—or at least increase its confidence in testing the limits of the United States and its allies. Of course, the situations in the Taiwan Strait and eastern Ukraine differ significantly in geography, military balance, allied commitments, and economic interdependence. They cannot simply be equated. Nevertheless, the psychological and political effects of precedents are real and cannot be ignored. Ultimately, the international order is not a machine that operates automatically. Its survival depends on whether major powers are willing to bear the costs of defending it. When a major power decides to test the limits of the international order, other countries’ responses—whether they push back or accept a “limited exception”—will be remembered by those who come later. That is precisely where the danger lies!

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